

*AI Ethics:*

Privacy & Machine Learning

CS229: Machine Learning  
Carlos Guestrin  
Stanford University


## Privacy Definition (*dictionary.com*)

2. the state of being free from unwanted or undue intrusion or disturbance in one's private life or affairs; freedom to be let alone.


3. freedom from damaging publicity, public scrutiny, secret surveillance, or unauthorized disclosure of one's personal data or information, as by a government, corporation, or individual.

# Privacy vs Security

- Privacy is about your control of your personal information (and how it's used)
- Security is about protection against unauthorized access




# Utility-Privacy Tradeoff




# Privacy by Anonymization

- A trusted curator removes personally-identifying information (name, SSN,...)



# Linkage Attack [Sweeney '00]

- Group Insurance Commission (GIC)
  - Anonymized data for ~135k patients for researchers and policy-makers
    - Including ZIP, birthdate and sex




# Linkage Attack [Sweeney '00]

- Group Insurance Commission (GIC)
  - Anonymized data for ~135k patients for researchers and policy-makers
    - Including ZIP, birthdate and sex
- Voter registration records
  - Name, ..., ZIP, birthdate, sex
- Uncovered health records, e.g., of William Weld (governor of Massachusetts at that time)

# Netflix Prize Linkage Attack




Netflix Prize 2006  
 Predict user rating  
 100 million movie ratings





# Privacy by Aggregation


- Common approach: aggregate counts, averages, trained models are private?



# Genome Wide Association Studies (GWAS) with single-nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs): Membership Attack

[Dwork et al.]


Kidney stone  
disease



HIPAA Compliant  
NIH Processes

- Able to infer if an individual's DNA is part of study

# Generative Model Inversion Attack [Zhang et al 2020]



# Randomized Response [Warner 1965]

# Randomized Response: Intuition

- $\tilde{\mu}$  has high variance if variance of  $w_i$  is large
- Add noise to each data point, e.g., estimate average

high noise  
 more privacy  
 less utility  
 low noise,  
 less privacy

salary  
 $x_1 = \$500k$   
 $\vdots$   
 $x_n = \$522k$

Add Noise  
 - zero mean  
 - Large variance  
 e.g.,  $w_i \sim \mathcal{N}(0, 100,000^2)$   
 Report  
 $z_i \leftarrow x_i + w_i$

$$\hat{\mu} = \frac{1}{N} \sum_i x_i \quad \left. \begin{array}{l} \text{more} \\ \text{utility} \end{array} \right\}$$


---


$$\tilde{\mu} = \frac{1}{N} \sum_i z_i$$


---


$$E_{\text{noise}}[\tilde{\mu}] = E\left[\frac{1}{N} \sum_i (x_i + w_i)\right]$$

$$= \frac{1}{N} \sum_i x_i + \frac{1}{N} \sum_i E[w_i]$$

$\tilde{\mu}$

# Differential Privacy

[Dwork et al. 2006]

(Dwork and Roth 2014 Book is great


reference: <https://www.cis.upenn.edu/~aaroht/Papers/privacybook.pdf>)

# Formal Framework for Privacy

- Provide provable privacy-preserving guarantees
  
- Develop efficient methods to add noise and learn from data

# Global Differential Privacy Framework

- You participate in “study”
  - i.e., provide data to trusted party
- Trusted party performs computations on data, but reveals answers that (attempt to) preserve privacy




- Goal: Provide provable privacy-preserving guarantees




# Differential Privacy Setup

- Database  $D$  includes sensitive information
- Data analyst asks queries on  $D$
- (Randomized) Mechanism  $M$  attempts to get response  $R$  to query, while attempting to avoid leaking of individual information



# Differential Privacy: Neighboring Databases

- Neighboring databases: two databases  $D_1$  and  $D_2$  only differ in a single entry



How many people grew up in Brazil

$Q(D_1) = 1221$       Carlos Yes

$Q(D_2) = 1220$       Alice No

---

$M(D_1) = Q(D_1) + w_1$       <sup>Noise</sup>

$M(D_2) = Q(D_2) + w_2$

} Noise large enough to hide Carlos' Contribution

# Differential Privacy Definition [Dwork et al. '06]

- **Neighboring databases:** two databases  $D_1$  and  $D_2$  only differ in a single entry
- A mechanism  $M$  is  $\epsilon$ -differentially private if, for any two neighboring databases, and any set  $R$  of possible responses:

$$\frac{P(M(D_1) \in R)}{P(M(D_2) \in R)} \leq e^\epsilon$$

prob. wRT noise  
you add, M adds

- **Note:** Differential Privacy is a definition, not algorithm to achieve it

# Differential Privacy Intuition

- You can't tell if it's me or someone else in the database
  - You can't tell if I was part of the study

$$e^{-\epsilon} \leq \frac{P(M(D_1) \in R)}{P(M(D_2) \in R)} \leq e^{\epsilon}$$

for small  $\epsilon$ ,  $e^{\epsilon} \approx 1 + \epsilon$

$\Rightarrow M(D_1) \approx M(D_2)$   
in probability

$$\frac{1}{1+\epsilon} \leq \frac{P(M(D_1) \in R)}{P(M(D_2) \in R)} \leq 1+\epsilon$$

# Laplace Mechanism

# Laplace Mechanism

$$p(w) = \frac{1}{b} \exp\left(-\frac{|w|}{b}\right)$$

Noise

- Add Laplace noise to the response

Query: Count(A in CS229), return Count + w

- How much noise to add?


- Depends on magnitude of results

- Suppose want to compute function  $f$  on database  $D$ ,

sensitivity of  $f = \max_{D_1, D_2 \text{ neighboring}} \|f(D_1) - f(D_2)\|_1$   $\Delta f = 1$

- To achieve  $\epsilon$ -differential privacy, noise level is:

$w \sim \text{Laplace}\left(0, \frac{\Delta f}{\epsilon}\right) \rightarrow$  achieve  $\epsilon$  differential privacy



# Laplace Mechanism Example: Counts

- Suppose you want to count how many people have salary > \$500k & got an A in CS281
  - $f$  is count function
- Sensitivity of  $f$ :  $\Delta f = 1$
- *To achieve  $\epsilon$ -differential privacy, noise level is:*

$$\text{Laplace} \left( 0, \frac{1}{\epsilon} \right)$$

# Proof for 1D Laplace Mechanism

$$p(w) = \frac{1}{b} \exp\left(-\frac{|w|}{b}\right)$$

- Neighboring databases  $D_1$  and  $D_2$
- Mechanism  $M$  to compute  $f$  returns:
  
- Achieving  $\epsilon$ -differential privacy:




# Practical Examples of Differential Privacy

# Practical Applications of Differential Privacy

Google search results for "census 2020 differential privacy".

- CBS Minnesota**: People, Homes 'Vanish' Due To 2020 Census' New Privacy Method. It's not a magic trick but rather a new statistical method the bureau is using called differential privacy, which involves the intentional... 1 month ago.
- Brooklyn Eagle**: People, homes vanish due to 2020 census' new privacy method. At least one analysis suggests that differential privacy could ... The Census Bureau, for its part, argues that the data is every bit as... 3 weeks ago.
- Benidji Pioneer**: Census data reports population decline in many northwestern ... The 2020 census reported some larger cities in northwestern Minnesota, ... Using differential privacy, the Census Bureau may report a... 1 month ago.
- NPR**: 2020 Census Data And Differential Privacy: What You Need ... For decades, the bureau has stripped away names and addresses from census records before turning them into anonymized data. That information is... May 19, 2021.



# Summary

- As we develop ML-based systems, it's important to consider privacy at every stage of the process
- Many methods and tools can help
- Ultimately, must manage the utility-privacy tradeoff

# Closing a busy quarter...



# You did amazing things...

- Huge number of topics
- Remote learning
- Challenging homeworks and midterm
- Amazing project
- ...

# This is just the start...

- You now have the skills to have real-world impact with ML
- But, machines are not the only ones who keep learning... 😊
  - CS229 prepares you for many other classes at Stanford
  - And beyond
- We can't wait to see the amazing things you come up with!

# Thank you to the amazing course staff!!!!!!!

## Course Manager



Swati Dube

## Head Course Assistant



Nandita  
Bhaskhar

## Course Assistants



Kyu-Young  
Kim



Beri Kohen  
Behar



Griffin Young



Sauren Khosla



Zhangjie Cao



David Lim



Soyeon Jung



Lantao Yu



Emmanuel  
Balogun



Jake Silberg



Ha Tran

Thank you!!!!!!!!!! 😊